Fodor's challenge to the classical computational theory of mind

Mind and Language 23 (1):123–143 (2008)
In The Mind Doesn’t Work that Way, Jerry Fodor argues that mental representations have context sensitive features relevant to cognition, and that, therefore, the Classical Computational Theory of Mind (CTM) is mistaken. We call this the Globality Argument. This is an in principle argument against CTM. We argue that it is self-defeating. We consider an alternative argument constructed from materials in the discussion, which avoids the pitfalls of the official argument. We argue that it is also unsound and that, while it is an empirical issue whether context sensitive features of mental representations are relevant to cognition, it is empirically implausible.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2007.00332.x
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References found in this work BETA
Jerry A. Fodor (1986). The Modularity of Mind. In Zenon W. Pylyshyn (ed.), Philosophical Review. Ablex 101-108.

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Citations of this work BETA
Richard Samuels (2010). Classical Computationalism and the Many Problems of Cognitive Relevance. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 41 (3):280-293.

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