David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Psychology 23 (4):427-445 (2010)
I address a criticism of the use of thought experiments in conceptual analysis advanced on the basis of the survey method of so-called experimental philosophy. The criticism holds that surveys show that intuitions are relative to cultures in a way that undermines the claim that intuition-based investigation yields any objective answer to philosophical questions. The crucial question is what intuitions are as philosophers have been interested in them. To answer this question we look at the role of intuitions in philosophical inquiry. When we have done this, we can see that it is impossible for intuitions properly understood to be relative in the way that has been suggested as they are conceived of as expressions of competence in the concepts deployed in their contents. The remaining methodological issues, though not to be dismissed, present no in principle objection to the method of thought experiments.
|Keywords||Intuitions Experimental Philosophy Conceptual Analysis Thought Experiments|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Alvin I. Goldman (1986). Epistemology and Cognition. Harvard University Press.
Jonathan M. Weinberg, Shaun Nichols & Stephen Stich (2001). Normativity and Epistemic Intuitions. Philosophical Topics, 29 (1-2):429-460.
Michael R. DePaul & William Ramsey (eds.) (1998). Rethinking Intuition: The Psychology of Intuition and its Role in Philosophical Inquiry. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers.
Edouard Machery, Ron Mallon, Shaun Nichols & Stephen P. Stich (2004). Semantics, Cross-Cultural Style. Cognition 92 (3):1-12.
R. M. Hare (1981). Moral Thinking: Its Levels, Method, and Point. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Adam Feltz & Edward Cokely (2012). The Philosophical Personality Argument. Philosophical Studies 161 (2):227-246.
David Rose & David Danks (2013). In Defense of a Broad Conception of Experimental Philosophy. Metaphilosophy 44 (4):512-532.
Moti Mizrahi (2014). Does the Method of Cases Rest on a Mistake? Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):183-197.
James Andow (2015). How Distinctive Is Philosophers’ Intuition Talk? Metaphilosophy 46 (4-5):515-538.
Joachim Horvath & Alex Wiegmann (forthcoming). Intuitive Expertise and Intuitions About Knowledge. Philosophical Studies:1-26.
Similar books and articles
Simon Cullen (2010). Survey-Driven Romanticism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):275-296.
Kevin Tobia, Wesley Buckwalter & Stephen Stich (2013). Moral Intuitions: Are Philosophers Experts? Philosophical Psychology 26 (5):629-638.
Brian Talbot (2009). Psychology and the Use of Intuitions in Philosophy. Studia Philosophica Estonica 2 (2):157-176.
Joel Pust (2001). Against Explanationist Skepticism Regarding Philosophical Intuitions. Philosophical Studies 106 (3):227 - 258.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (2014). Intuitions in Science: Thought Experiments as Argument Pumps. In Anthony R. Booth & Darrell P. Rowbottom (eds.), Intuitions. Oxford University Press 119-134.
Adina L. Roskies & Shaun Nichols (2008). Bringing Moral Responsibility Down to Earth. Journal of Philosophy 105 (7):371-388.
James McBain (1999). The Role of Theory Contamination in Intuitions. Southwest Philosophy Review 15 (1):197-204.
Elke Brendel (2004). Intuition Pumps and the Proper Use of Thought Experiments. Dialectica 58 (1):89–108.
Added to index2010-08-19
Total downloads151 ( #25,211 of 1,911,313 )
Recent downloads (6 months)32 ( #23,038 of 1,911,313 )
How can I increase my downloads?