Noûs 30 (4):434-460 (1996)
|Abstract||(1) Content properties are nonrelational, that is, having a content property does not entail the existence of any contingent object not identical with the thinker or a part of the thinker.2 (2) We have noninferential knowledge of our conscious thoughts, that is, for any of our..|
|Keywords||Cartesianism Epistemology Knowledge Mind Thought|
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