There's Something About Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument
MIT Press (2004)
| Abstract | The arguments presented in this comprehensive collection have important implications for the philosophy of mind and the study of consciousness. | |||||||||
| Keywords | Ability Consciousness Epiphenomenalism Epistemology Knowledge Metaphysics Phenomena Physicalism Qualia Jackson, F | |||||||||
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| Buy the book | $29.22 new (19% off) $29.25 direct from Amazon (19% off) Amazon page | |||||||||
| ISBN(s) | 9780262621892 0262621894 | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesNeil Campbell (2003). An Inconsistency in the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 58 (2):261-266.
G. Furash (1989). Frank Jackson's Knowledge Argument Against Materialism. Dialogue 32 (October):1-6.
Neil Campbell (2012). Reply to Nagasawa on the Inconsistency Objection to the Knowledge Argument. Erkenntnis 76 (1):137-145.
Sam Coleman (2009). Why the Ability Hypothesis is Best Forgotten. Journal of Consciousness Studies 16 (2-3):74-97.
Frank Jackson (2006). The Knowledge Argument, Diaphanousness, Representationalism. In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
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Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.) (2007/2009). Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Torin Alter (2006). Does Representationalism Undermine the Knowledge Argument? In Torin Alter & Sven Walter (eds.), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism. Oxford University Press.
Fredrik Stjernberg, Not so Epiphenomenal Qualia. Spinning Ideas.
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