Une défense hétérodoxe de la conception inférentialiste de I'introspection

Dialogue 44 (1):123-144 (2005)
Abstract
Le but de cet article est de défendre une conception inférentialiste de l’introspection des qualia contre une série d’objections apparemment décisives. Selon la theorie inférentialiste, une auto-attribution d’un état qualitatifest la conclusion d’un raisonnement, plutôt que le résultat d’une expérience d’un type spécifique. Contre cela, il a été remarqué qu'il ne semble pas exister de raisonnements déductifs formellement corrects permettant d’arriver à une conclusion introspective. Je concède que toute tentative visant à construire de tels raisonnements est à coup sûr vouée à l’échec. Mais cela ne me semble pas menacer l’approche inférentialiste. Certaines inférences sont en effet correctes non pas en vertu de leur forme logique, mais en raison du sens des concepts qu’elles mobilisent. Je soutiens que c’est précisément le cas des raisonnement introspectifs. Ceux-ci sont matériellement corrects, en raison des relations inférentielles a priori reliant le concept d’expérience consciente à certains concepts démonstratifs.The aim of this article is to defend the inferentialist conception of qualia introspection against some apparently decisive objections. According to inferentialism, a self-attribution of a qualitative state is to be understood as the conclusion of an inference, rather than as issuing from an experience of a specific kind. It has been objected that formally correct inferences warranting introspective conclusions are simply not to be found. I concede this point, but maintain that inferentialism should not be abandoned. Some deductive inferences are correct because of the contents of the concepts which occur in them, rather than in virtue of their logical form. I claim that this is what happens for introspective inferences: they are materially correct because of apriori conceptual liaisons linking the concept of a conscious experience with a certain class of demonstrative concepts
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