Personal attachment to beliefs

Metaphilosophy 38 (1):55–70 (2007)
Abstract There is a tendency in philosophical discussions to see beliefs as belonging to specific people—to see things in terms of "your" belief, or "my" belief, or "Smith's" belief. I call this "personal attachment to beliefs." This mindset is unconscious, deeply ingrained, and a powerful background stance in discussion and thinking. Attachment has a negative impact on the quality of philosophical discussion and learning: difficulties in acknowledging error and changing beliefs, blindness to new evidence, difficulties in understanding new ideas, entrenchment in views, rancorous behavior, and the encouragement of competitive personal contests rather than collaborative searches for the truth. This article investigates the nature of attachment and traces out some of the undesirable consequences for classroom philosophical discussion, thinking, writing, and learning. It presents an alternative model to attachment and offers constructive suggestions for implementing the results of the investigation in the philosophy classroom and elsewhere.
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories No categories specified (fix it)
Options
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
 
Download options
PhilPapers Archive


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 5,709
External links
  • Through your library Configure

    Similar books and articles

    Analytics

    Monthly downloads

    Added to index

    2009-01-28

    Total downloads

    8 ( #123,255 of 549,694 )

    Recent downloads (6 months)

    0

    How can I increase my downloads?


    My notes
    Sign in to use this feature


    Discussion
    Start a new thread
    Order:
    There  are no threads in this forum
    Nothing in this forum yet.

    Other forums