The process of discovery

Philosophy of Science 52 (2):207-220 (1985)
Abstract
The main argument of this paper is that philosophical difficulties regarding scientific discovery arise mainly because philosophers base their arguments on a flawed picture of scientific research. Careful examination of N. R. Hanson's treatment of Kepler's discovery not only puts the rationality of this discovery beyond question, it also reveals what its rationality consists in. We can retrieve the point stressed by Hanson concerning the rational character of discoveries such as Kepler's even as we reject the type of "logical" analysis he proposes
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Citations of this work BETA
Brian S. Baigrie (1990). The Justification of Kepler's Ellipse. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 21 (4):633-664.
Brian S. Baigrie (1992). Generativist Versus Foundational Justification: A Reply to Andrew Lugg. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 23 (3):503-508.
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