Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Studies 47 (1):15 - 21 (1985)
|Abstract||My immediate conclusion, therefore, is a modest one. I only specifically rule out the semantic convention for definite descriptions in which the semantic referent just is the speaker's referent. In arguing for that I carefully avoided relying on the helpfulness assumption. But I did, implicitly, make use of the following procedure.In examining a claim that C is the semantic convention (or form of convention) for a term (or class of term), check to see that C is capable of being helpful to the extent that an inspection of cases of successful communication employing that term shows it must be.My broader moral is that such a procedure should be employed in determining what are our semantic conventions|
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