David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Studies 47 (1):15 - 21 (1985)
My immediate conclusion, therefore, is a modest one. I only specifically rule out the semantic convention for definite descriptions in which the semantic referent just is the speaker's referent. In arguing for that I carefully avoided relying on the helpfulness assumption. But I did, implicitly, make use of the following procedure.In examining a claim that C is the semantic convention (or form of convention) for a term (or class of term), check to see that C is capable of being helpful to the extent that an inspection of cases of successful communication employing that term shows it must be.My broader moral is that such a procedure should be employed in determining what are our semantic conventions
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Rod Bertolet (1980). The Semantic Significance of Donnellan's Distinction. Philosophical Studies 37 (3):281 - 288.
Michael Devitt (1981). Donnellan's Distinction. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 6 (1):511-526.
Keith S. Donnellan (1968). Putting Humpty Dumpty Together Again. Philosophical Review 77 (2):203-215.
Keith S. Donnellan (1966). Reference and Definite Descriptions. Philosophical Review 75 (3):281-304.
Keith S. Donnellan (1979). Speaker Reference, Descriptions, and Anaphoria. In A. French Peter, E. Uehling Theodore, Howard Jr & K. Wettstein (eds.), Contemporary Perspectives in the Philosophy of Language. University of Minnesota Press.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Antonio Rauti (2012). Multiple Groundings and Deference. Philosophical Quarterly 62 (247):317-336.
Luciano Floridi (2008). Understanding Epistemic Relevance. Erkenntnis 69 (1):69 - 92.
Samuel C. Rickless (2012). Why and How to Fill an Unfilled Proposition. Theoria 78 (1):6-25.
Henry Jackman (2009). Semantic Intuitions, Conceptual Analysis, and Cross-Cultural Variation. Philosophical Studies 146 (2):159 - 177.
K. Romdenh-Romluc (2006). I. Philosophical Studies 128 (2):257 - 283.
Susanna Siegel (2002). The Role of Perception in Demonstrative Reference. Philosophers' Imprint 2 (1):1-21.
Annalisa Coliva (2003). The First Person: Error Through Misidentification, the Split Between Speaker's and Semantic Reference, and the Real Guarantee. Journal of Philosophy 100 (8):416-431.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads59 ( #28,671 of 1,102,098 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #68,222 of 1,102,098 )
How can I increase my downloads?