David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 13 (5):561-584 (2010)
Being a formal and general as well as the most widely accepted approach to practical rationality, rational decision theory should be crucial for justifying rational morals. In particular, acting morally should also be rational in decision theoretic terms. After defending this thesis, in the critical part of the paper two strategies to develop morals following this insight are criticized: game theoretical ethics of cooperation and ethical intuitionism. The central structural objections to ethics of cooperation are that they too directly aim at the rationality of moral action and that they to do not encompass moral values or a moral desirability function. The constructive half of the paper takes up these criticisms by developing a two-part strategy to bring rationality and morals in line. The first part is to define ‘moral desirability’. This is done, using multi-attribute utility theory, by equating several adequate components of an individual’s comprehensive utility function with the moral desirability function. The second part is to introduce mechanisms, institutions, in particular socially valid moral norms, that provide further motivation for acting in accordance with morals
|Keywords||Justification of morals Rationality requirement Ethical internalism Rational decision Multi-attribute utility theory Prudentialistic desirability theory Sympathy Respect Moral desirability Moral obligations Socially valid norms Moral norms Ethics of cooperation Contract theory Ethical intuitionism|
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References found in this work BETA
David P. Gauthier (1986). Morals by Agreement. Oxford University Press.
K. G. Binmore (2005). Natural Justice. Oxford University Press.
David Krantz, Duncan Luce, Patrick Suppes & Amos Tversky (eds.) (1971). Foundations of Measurement, Vol. I: Additive and Polynomial Representations. New York Academic Press.
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