Expectations without content

Mind and Language 25 (2):217-236 (2010)
In this paper I show how the way experience presents things to us can be treated without attributing a representational content to experience. The basic claim that experience can present us with more things than the range of things available to us in thought is neutral with respect to the choice between a content account of experience and a naïve content-free account. I show how Meyer's theory of expectations in accounting for our experience of music supports the naïve account. Expectations provide an account of the conditions that enable things to be salient in experience as targets for attention. Expectations do not provide a content to experience.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1468-0017.2009.01387.x
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References found in this work BETA
John McDowell (1994). Mind and World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

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Michael Luntley (2009). On Education and Initiation. Journal of Philosophy of Education 43 (s1):41-56.

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