International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101 (2012)
|Abstract||Patrick Grim has put forward a set theoretical argument purporting to prove that omniscience is an inconsistent concept and a model theoretical argument for the claim that we cannot even consistently define omniscience. The former relies on the fact that the class of all truths seems to be an inconsistent multiplicity (or a proper class, a class that is not a set); the latter is based on the difficulty of quantifying over classes that are not sets. We first address the set theoretical argument and make explicit some ways in which it depends on mathematical Platonism. Then we sketch a non Platonistic account of inconsistent multiplicities, based on the notion of indefinite extensibility, and show how Grim’s set theoretical argument could fail to be conclusive in such a context. Finally, we confront Grim’s model theoretical argument suggesting a way to define a being as omniscient without quantifying over any inconsistent multiplicity.|
|Keywords||Cantor’s theorem Indefinite extensibility Omniscience Platonism Truth Universe of discourse|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Peter Clark (1998). Dummett's Argument for the Indefinite Extensibility of Set and Real Number. Grazer Philosophische Studien 55:51-63.
Gabriel Uzquiano (forthcoming). Varieties of Indefinite Extensibility. Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic.
Alexander R. Pruss (2003). Post's Critiques of Omniscience and of Talk of All True Propositions. Philo 6 (1):49-58.
Yujin Nagasawa (2003). Divine Omniscience and Knowledge de Se. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 53 (2):73-82.
John F. Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo 6 (1):33-48.
John Post (2003). Omniscience, Weak PSR, and Method. Philo: A Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):33-48.
Patrick Grim (1990). On Omniscience and a 'Set of All Truths': A Reply to Bringsjord. Analysis 50 (4):271 - 276.
Alvin Plantinga & Patrick Grim (1993). Truth, Omniscience, and Cantorian Arguments: An Exchange. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 71 (3):267 - 306.
Joshua T. Spencer (2006). Two Mereological Arguments Against the Possibility of an Omniscient Being. Philo 9 (1):62-72.
Dennis Whitcomb (forthcoming). Grounding and Omniscience. In Jon Kvanvig (ed.), Oxford Studies in Philosophy of Religion Vol. 4. OUP.
Patrick Grim & Alvin Plantinga (1993). ``Truth, Omniscience and Cantorian Arguments: An Exchange&Quot. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 71 (3):267-306.
Christopher Steinsvold (2008). A Grim Semantics for Logics of Belief. Journal of Philosophical Logic 37 (1):45 - 56.
Christopher Menzel (2012). Sets and Worlds Again. Analysis 72 (2):304-309.
Added to index2011-04-26
Total downloads25 ( #55,665 of 722,863 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,863 )
How can I increase my downloads?