Graduate studies at Western
Mind and Matter 7 (1):81-90 (2009)
|Abstract||Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that canno be a computation.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Gualtiero Piccinini (2003). Computations and Computers in the Sciences of Mind and Brain. Dissertation. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh
William J. Rapaport (1998). How Minds Can Be Computational Systems. Journal of Experimental and Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 10 (4):403-419.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2007). Computationalism, the Church–Turing Thesis, and the Church–Turing Fallacy. Synthese 154 (1):97-120.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2009). Computationalism in the Philosophy of Mind. Philosophy Compass 4 (3):515-532.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Resilience of Computationalism. Philosophy of Science 77 (5):852-861.
Matthias Scheutz (2002). Computationalism: The Next Generation. In , Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
Gualtiero Piccinini (2010). The Mind as Neural Software? Understanding Functionalism, Computationalism, and Computational Functionalism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 81 (2):269-311.
John Haugeland (2002). Authentic Intentionality. In Matthias Scheutz (ed.), Computationalism: New Directions. MIT Press.
Marcin Miłkowski (2007). Is Computationalism Trivial? In Gordana Dodig Crnkovic & Susan Stuart (eds.), Computation, Information, Cognition: The Nexus and the Liminal. Cambridge Scholars Press.
Eric Dietrich (1990). Computationalism. Social Epistemology 4 (2):135-154.
Sorry, there are not enough data points to plot this chart.
Added to index2009-09-21
Total downloads1 ( #293,734 of 749,976 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #62,892 of 749,976 )
How can I increase my downloads?