Intentionality and Computationalism. A Diagonal Argument.

Mind and Matter 7 (1):81-90 (2009)
Abstract
Computationalism is the claim that all possible thoughts are computations, i.e. executions of algorithms. The aim of the paper is to show that if intentionality is semantically clear, in a way defined in the paper, then computationalism must be false. Using a convenient version of the phenomenological relation of intentionality and a diagonalization device inspired by Thomson's theorem of 1962, we show there exists a thought that canno be a computation.
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    Laureano Luna (2012). Grim's Arguments Against Omniscience and Indefinite Extensibility. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 72 (2):89-101.
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