David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Explorations 1 (1):10 – 27 (1998)
This paper explores the idea that the structure of intentionality is fundamentally the structure of a practice, not the structure of a language, or some quasi-linguistic system of representational entities. I show how and why neo-Fregean theory of content is committed to this practical turn. Mis-representation is often thought to be problematic for the neo-Fregean, but I show not only that it accommodates the phenomena better than the representationalist position, but also that the idea of error that the representationalist wants with empty singular terms is redundant, for it has no role to play in explaining the systematicity of thought.
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References found in this work BETA
Gareth Evans (1982). Varieties of Reference. Oxford University Press.
J. Campbell (1994). Past, Space, and Self. MIT Press.
Quassim Cassam (1997). Self and World. Oxford University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Simon Prosser (2005). Cognitive Dynamics and Indexicals. Mind and Language 20 (4):369–391.
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