Understanding anthropologists

Inquiry 25 (2):199 – 216 (1982)
In this paper I show how to treat problems in the philosophy of the social sciences, in particular anthropology, without the need to settle questions in the theory of meaning about realism and anti?realism. In doing this, I show how it is possible, contrary to received opinion, to ward off conceptual relativism without adoption of realist semantics. The argument involves sketching the feasibility of a viable non?realist concept of objectivity. Having distinguished the required notion of objectivity, I then bring this to bear on issues that have dominated the philosophy of anthropology in recent years: the translatability of ritual beliefs; the adequacy of symbolist anthropology; the concept of rationality. I offer a new way of handling these issues which supports an anti?realist, but intellectualist, account of ritual belief
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DOI 10.1080/00201748208601962
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References found in this work BETA
Peter Winch (1959). The Idea of a Social Science. Les Etudes Philosophiques 14 (2):247-248.
Dan Sperber & Alice L. Morton (1977). Rethinking Symbolism. Philosophy and Rhetoric 10 (4):281-282.

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