David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Environmental Values 8 (1):27 - 54 (1999)
I classify different sorts of natural resources and suggest how these resources may be acquired. I also argue that inventions, whether gadgets or artificial life forms, should not be privately owned. Gadgets and life-forms are not created (although the term 'invention' suggests otherwise); they are discovered, and hence have much in common with more familiar natural resources such as sunlight that ought not to be privately owned. Nonetheless, inventors of gadgets, like discoverers of certain more familiar resources, sometimes should be granted exclusive but temporary control over their inventions as an incentive for making unknown items widely accessible
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
Hans Radder (2013). Exploring Philosophical Issues in the Patenting of Scientific and Technological Inventions. Philosophy and Technology 26 (3):283-300.
Similar books and articles
Jan Narveson (2001). Communication and Human Good. Social Philosophy Today 17:91-102.
Margaret A. Boden (ed.) (1996). The Philosophy of Artificial Life. Oxford University Press.
Norman H. Packard & Mark A. Bedau (2003). Artificial Life. In L. Nadel (ed.), Encyclopedia of Cognitive Science. Nature Publishing Group. 505-512.
Jessica Riskin (ed.) (2007). Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life. University of Chicago Press.
Brian L. Keeley (1994). Against the Global Replacement: On the Application of the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence to Artificial Life. In C. G. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life Iii: Proceedings of the Workshop on Artificial Life. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Studies 26 (2):83-106.
T. L. S. Sprigge (1999). Dreyfus and Spinosa on Things-in-Themselves. Inquiry 42 (1):115 – 124.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads9 ( #163,661 of 1,100,127 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #304,144 of 1,100,127 )
How can I increase my downloads?