Natural resources, gadgets, and artificial life
| Abstract | Inventions should belong to no one. It does not matter whether the invention is a genetically engineered life form or a mechanism such as the more familiar radio: it should not be private property. More precisely, types of things invented by people (such as the radio or the dog) as opposed to particular things (such as the radio in my car and the dog in my back yard) should not be private property, with one qualification: At most, people should expect monopolies for brief periods of time on the use of the types of gadgets and creatures they invent, after which such types of things (again: as distinct from particular gadgets and creatures) should be freely accessible by all. The monopoly I have in mind bears some resemblance to the monopoly provided by the patent system, but towards the end of the essay I will suggest ways in which that system needs to be rethought, restructured, and extended. | |||||||||
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Tom Froese & Shaun Gallagher (2010). Phenomenology and Artificial Life: Toward a Technological Supplementation of Phenomenological Methodology. Husserl Studies 26 (2):83-106.
Brian L. Keeley (1994). Against the Global Replacement: On the Application of the Philosophy of Artificial Intelligence to Artificial Life. In C. G. Langton (ed.), Artificial Life Iii: Proceedings of the Workshop on Artificial Life. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
Jessica Riskin (ed.) (2007). Genesis Redux: Essays in the History and Philosophy of Artificial Life. University of Chicago Press.
Margaret A. Boden (ed.) (1996). The Philosophy of Artificial Life. Oxford University Press.
Jan Narveson (2001). Communication and Human Good. Social Philosophy Today 17:91-102.
T. L. S. Sprigge (1999). Dreyfus and Spinosa on Things-in-Themselves. Inquiry 42 (1):115 – 124.
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