The Possibility of Knowledge: Nozick and His Critics

Totowa, New Jersey: Rowman and Littlefield (1987)
This volume of original essays assesses Nozick's analyses of knowledge and evidence and his approach to skepticism. Several of the contributors claim that Nozick has not succeeded in rebutting the skeptic; some offer fresh accounts of skepticism and its flaws; others criticize Nozick's externalist accounts of knowledge and evidence; still others welcome externalism but attempt to replace Nozick's accounts of knowledge and evidence with more plausible analyses
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ISBN(s) 9780847674466
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John Earman (1993). Underdetermination, Realism, and Reason. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 18 (1):19-38.

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