Belief Attribution in Animals: On How to Move Forward Conceptually and Empirically [Book Review]

There is considerable debate in comparative psychology and philosophy over whether nonhuman animals can attribute beliefs. The empirical studies that suggest that they can are shown to be inconclusive, and the main philosophical and empirical arguments that purport to show they cannot are shown to be invalid or weak. What is needed to move the debate and the field forward, it is argued, is a fundamentally new experimental protocol for testing belief attribution in animals, one capable of distinguishing genuine belief-attributing subjects from their perceptual-state attributing and behavior-reading counterparts. Such a protocol is outlined and defended. The rest, it is argued, is in the hands of experimentalists
Keywords Philosophy   Neurosciences   Philosophy of Mind   Epistemology   Philosophy of Science   Developmental Psychology   Cognitive Psychology
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-010-0042-z
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Michael Roche (2013). Povinelli's Problem and Introspection. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 4 (4):559-576.

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Simone Gozzano (2007). The Beliefs of Mute Animals. In Mario De Caro, Francesco Ferretti & Massimo Marraffa (eds.), Cartography of the Mind. Kluwer

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