|Abstract||Based on a formalization of constructive empiricism’s core concept of empirical adequacy, I show that some previous discussions rest on misunderstandings of empirical adequacy. Using one of the inspirations for constructive empiricism, I generalize the concept of a theory to avoid implausible presumptions about the relations of theoretical concepts and observations, and generalize empirical adequacy to allow for lack of knowledge, approximations, and successive gain of knowledge and precision. As a test case, I provide an application of the concepts to a simple interference phenomenon.|
|Keywords||constructive empiricism empirical adequacy approximation vagueness subtruth subvaluation received view empirical substructure empirical embedding empirical relativized reduct|
|Through your library||Only published papers are available at libraries|
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