On a Straw Man in the Philosophy of Science: A Defense of the Received View

I defend the Received View on scientific theories as developed by Carnap, Hempel, and Feigl against a number of criticisms based on misconceptions. First, I dispute the claim that the Received View demands axiomatizations in first order logic, and the further claim that these axiomatizations must include axioms for the mathematics used in the scientific theories. Next, I contend that models are important according to the Received View. Finally, I argue against the claim that the Received View is intended to make the concept of a theory more precise. Rather, it is meant as a generalizable framework for explicating specific theories.
Keywords received view  syntactic view  semantic view  axiomatization  explication  scientific models
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DOI 10.1086/664460
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References found in this work BETA
Michael Weisberg (2007). Who is a Modeler? British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 58 (2):207 - 233.
Steven French & James Ladyman (1999). Reinflating the Semantic Approach. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 13 (2):103 – 121.
Daniela M. Bailer-Jones (2003). When Scientific Models Represent. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 17 (1):59 – 74.
Gordon Belot (2005). Whose Devil? Which Details? Philosophy of Science 72 (1):128-153.

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Citations of this work BETA
Adam Caulton (2015). The Role of Symmetry in the Interpretation of Physical Theories. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part B: Studies in History and Philosophy of Modern Physics 52:153-162.

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