Graduate studies at Western
Synthese 182 (1):131-148 (2011)
|Abstract||The distinction between data and phenomena introduced by Bogen and Woodward (Philosophical Review 97(3):303–352, 1988) was meant to help accounting for scientific practice, especially in relation with scientific theory testing. Their article and the subsequent discussion is primarily viewed as internal to philosophy of science. We shall argue that the data/phenomena distinction can be used much more broadly in modelling processes in philosophy|
|Keywords||Modelling Methodology Metaphilosophy|
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