A particularly compelling refutation of eliminative materialism

In D. M. Johnson & C. E. Erneling (eds.), The Mind as a Scientific Object: Between Brain and Culture. OUP 197 (2005)
The 1960s saw heated discussion of Eliminative Materialism in regard to sensations and their phenomenal features. Thus directed, Eliminative Materialism is materialism or physicalism plus the distinctive and truly radical thesis that there have never occurred any sensations; no one has ever experienced a sensation. This view attracted few adherents(!), though to this day some philosophers are Eliminativists with respect to various alleged phenomenal features of sensations
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Nathan Stemmer (2007). Quine's Eliminativism and the Crystal Spheres. Journal for General Philosophy of Science / Zeitschrift für Allgemeine Wissenschaftstheorie 38 (2):315 - 327.

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