A truth predicate in the object language
| Abstract | The semantic paradoxes arise when the range of the quantifiers in the object language is too generous in certain ways. But it is not really clear how unfair to Urdu or to Hindi it would be to view the range of their quantifiers as insufficient to yield an explicit definition of ‗true-in-Urdu‘ or ‗true-in- Hindi‘. Or, to put the matter in another, if not more serious, way, there may in the nature of the case always be something we grasp in understanding the language of another (the concept of truth) that we cannot communicate to him. In any case, most of the problems of general philosophical interest arise within a fragment of the relevant natural language that may be conceived as containing very little set theory. Of course these comments do not meet the claim that natural languages are universal. But it seems to me this claim, now that we know such universality leads to paradox, is suspect. –―Truth and Meaning‖. | |||||||||
| Keywords | No keywords specified (fix it) | |||||||||
| Categories | ||||||||||
| Options |
|
|||||||||
Download options| PhilPapers Archive |
Upload a copy of this paper Check publisher's policy on self-archival Papers currently archived: 5,709 |
| External links |
  Try with proxy. |
| Through your library | Only published papers are available at libraries |
Similar books and articlesJody Azzouni (2001). Truth Via Anaphorically Unrestricted Quantifiers. Journal of Philosophical Logic 30 (4):329-354.
Hartry Field (2003). A Revenge-Immune Solution to the Semantic Paradoxes. Journal of Philosophical Logic 32 (2):139-177.
Donald Davidson (1994). What is Quine's View of Truth? Inquiry 37 (4):437 – 440.
Alberto Vanzo (2010). Kant on the Nominal Definition of Truth. Kant-Studien 101 (2):147-166.
Volker Halbach (1995). Tarski Hierarchies. Erkenntnis 43 (3):339 - 367.
Peter Roeper (2010). Reasoning with Truth. Journal of Philosophical Logic 39 (3).
David DeVidi & Graham Solomon (1999). Tarski on “Essentially Richer” Metalanguages. Journal of Philosophical Logic 28 (1):1-28.
Dirk Greimann (2007). Did Frege Really Consider Truth as an Object? Grazer Philosophische Studien 75 (1):125-148.
Douglas Patterson (2005). Deflationism and the Truth Conditional Theory of Meaning. Philosophical Studies 124 (3):271 - 294.
Analytics
Monthly downloads |
Added to index2009-09-12Total downloads52 ( #20,006 of 549,550 )Recent downloads (6 months)2 ( #37,418 of 549,550 )How can I increase my downloads? |
My notes
Discussion
