MIT Press (1987)
In this book, William Lycan reviews the diverse philosophical views on consciousness--including those of Kripke, Block, Campbell, Sellars, and Casteneda--and ..
Keywords Awareness  Color  Consciousness  Free Will  Functionalism  Intentionality  Metaphysics  Nature  Quality  Homunculus
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ISBN(s) 0262620960   9780262620963  
DOI 10.2307/2185493
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William Lycan (2009). Giving Dualism its Due. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563.
Peter Carruthers (2010). Introspection: Divided and Partly Eliminated. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (1):76-111.

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