Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning
Topoi 29 (2):99-108 (2010)
| Abstract | The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed | |||||||||
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Similar books and articlesKari Middleton (2007). The Inconsistency of Deflationary Truth and Davidsonian Meaning. The Proceedings of the Twenty-First World Congress of Philosophy 6:99-103.
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