Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning

Topoi 29 (2):99-108 (2010)
Abstract
The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed
Keywords Character  Deflationary truth  Determination argument  Meaning  Truth conditions  Use  Verificationism
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    References found in this work BETA
    William P. Alston (1963). Meaning and Use. Philosophical Quarterly 13 (51):107-124.
    Robert Brandom (1983). Asserting. Noûs 17 (4):637-650.

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