Topoi 29 (2):99-108 (2010)
|Abstract||The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed|
|Keywords||Character Deflationary truth Determination argument Meaning Truth conditions Use Verificationism|
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