Direct Arguments for the Truth-Condition Theory of Meaning

Topoi 29 (2):99-108 (2010)
The truth-condition theory of meaning is, naturally, thought of an as explanatory theory whose explananda are the meaning facts. But there are at least two deductive arguments that purport to establish the truth of the theory irrespective of its explanatory virtues. This paper examines those arguments and concludes that they succeed.
Keywords Character  Deflationary truth  Determination argument  Meaning  Truth conditions  Use  Verificationism
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DOI 10.1007/s11245-009-9070-7
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References found in this work BETA
Paul Horwich (2005). Truth. In Frank Jackson & Michael Smith (eds.), Erkenntnis. Oxford University Press 261-272.
Donald Davidson (2010). Truth and Meaning. In Darragh Byrne & Max Kölbel (eds.), Synthese. Routledge 304 - 323.

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