Giving dualism its due

Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563 (2009)
Abstract
Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered
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References found in this work BETA
Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316–337.
Karen Bennett (2007). Mental Causation. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):316-337.

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Citations of this work BETA
Greg Janzen (2012). Physicalists Have Nothing to Fear From Ghosts. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):91-104.

View all 8 citations

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