Graduate studies at Western
Australasian Journal of Philosophy 87 (4):551-563 (2009)
|Abstract||Despite the current resurgence of modest forms of mind?body dualism, traditional Cartesian immaterial-substance dualism has few, if any, defenders. This paper argues that no convincing case has been made against substance dualism, and that standard objections to it can be credibly answered|
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