Phenomenal information again: It is both real and intrinsically perspectival

Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):239-42 (1998)
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Abstract

In two recent publications I argued against Nemirow and Lewis that there is distinctive, irreducibly phenomenal and perspectival information of the sort alleged by Jackson; but I gave an account of such information that is entirely compatible with a materialist view of human subjects. Hershfield argues that the latter account is inadequate, in that it fails to support the claim that the information it characterizes is irreducibly phenomenal or perspectival. I reply that Hershfield's conclusion does not follow from his argument's premises

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10.1080/09515089808573258

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William G. Lycan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill

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What experience teaches.David K. Lewis - 1990 - In William G. Lycan (ed.), Mind and Cognition. Blackwell. pp. 29--57.
A limited defense of phenomenal information.William G. Lycan - 1995 - In Thomas Metzinger (ed.), Conscious Experience. Imprint Academic. pp. 243--58.
Lycan on the subjectivity of the mental.Jeffrey Hershfield - 1998 - Philosophical Psychology 11 (2):229-38.

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