David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (2000)
The idea of representation has been central in discussions of intentionality for many years. But only more recently has it begun playing a wider role in the philosophy of mind, particularly in theories of consciousness. Indeed, there are now multiple representational theories of consciousness, corresponding to different uses of the term "conscious," each attempting to explain the corresponding phenomenon in terms of representation. More cautiously, each theory attempts to explain its target phenomenon in terms of _intentionality_, and assumes that intentionality is representation.
|Keywords||Consciousness History Metaphysics Mind Armstrong, D|
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Rocco J. Gennaro (2008). Representationalism, Peripheral Awareness, and the Transparency of Experience. Philosophical Studies 139 (1):39-56.
Dimitris Platchias (2009). Representationalism, Symmetrical Supervenience and Identity. Philosophia 37 (1):31-46.
Robert Schroer (2009). Does the Phenomenality of Perceptual Experience Present an Obstacle to Phenomenal Externalism? Philosophical Papers 39 (1):93-110.
Murat Aydede & Matthew Fulkerson (2014). Affect: Representationalists' Headache. Philosophical Studies 170 (2):175-198.
Max Deutsch (2012). The Way Ripe Tomatoes Look: An Argument Against Externalist Representationalism. [REVIEW] Erkenntnis 77 (3):297-316.
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