Alethic functionalism and our folk theory of truth

Synthese 145 (1):29 - 43 (2005)
According to alethic functionalism, truth is a higher-order multiply realizable property of propositions. After briefly presenting the views main principles and motivations, I defend alethic functionalism from recent criticisms raised against it by Cory Wright. Wright argues that alethic functionalism will collapse either into deflationism or into a view that takes true as simply ambiguous. I reject both claims.
Keywords Philosophy   Philosophy   Epistemology   Logic   Metaphysics   Philosophy of Language
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DOI 10.2307/20118580
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References found in this work BETA
David Lewis (1972). Psychophysical and Theoretical Identifications. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 50 (December):249-58.
Hartry Field (1972). Tarski's Theory of Truth. Journal of Philosophy 64 (13):347-375.
P. A. Boghossian (1997). Analyticity. In B. Hale & C. Wright (eds.), A Companion to the Philosophy of Language. Blackwell 331-368.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
Cory D. Wright (2010). Truth, Ramsification, and the Pluralist's Revenge. Australasian Journal of Philosophy 88 (2):265-283.
Douglas Edwards (2011). Simplifying Alethic Pluralism. Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (1):28-48.

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