David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Hume Studies 22 (1):89-104 (1996)
The purpose of this paper is to explain Hume's account of the way both the scope and the degree of benevolent motivation is limited. I argue that Hume consistently affirms, both in the _Treatise<D> and in the second _Enquiry<D>, (i) that the scope of benevolent motivation is very broad, such that it includes any creature that is conscious and capable of thought, and (ii) that the degree of benevolent motivation is limited, such that a person is naturally inclined to feel benevolence more strongly for one with whom he or she has a 'connexion', e.g., a family member or friend.
|Keywords||Hume on reason Hume's skepticism Hume's naturalism|
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John J. Callanan (2006). Kant's Transcendental Strategy. Philosophical Quarterly 56 (224):360–381.
Louis E. Loeb (2001). Integrating Hume's Accounts of Belief and Justification. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 63 (2):279-303.
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