III. On the very idea of a form of life

Inquiry 27 (1-4):277-289 (1984)
Drawing on writers as diverse as Saul Kripke, Stanley Cavell, G. E. M. Anscombe, Jonathan Lear, and Bernard Williams, I offer an interpretation of Wittgenstein's key notion of a form of life that explains why Wittgenstein was so enigmatic about it. Then, I show how Hilary Putnam's criticism of Wittgenstein's philosophy of mathematics and Richard Rorty's support of (what he takes to be) Wittgenstein's legacy in the philosophy of mind both require mistaken assumptions about Wittgenstein's idea of a form of life. Finally, I consider the extent to which the idea of a form of life is subject to Donald Davidson's critique of the idea of a conceptual scheme
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    Donald Davidson (1973). On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme. Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 47:5--20.
    Barry G. Stroud (1965). Wittgenstein and Logical Necessity. Philosophical Review 74 (October):504-518.

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