In Praise of Reason

MIT Press (2012)
Abstract
Can we give objective reasons for our most basic standards of reason-- our fundamental epistemic principles? I argue, against several forms of skepticism about reason, that we can, but that the reasons we can give for epistemic principles are ultimately practical, not epistemic.
Keywords Epistemology  Rationality  Skepticism
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ISBN(s) 0262017229   9780262017220
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