Minimalism and the value of truth

Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517 (2004)
Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project
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References found in this work BETA
Simon Blackburn (2001). Reason, Virtue, and Knowledge. In Abrol Fairweather & Linda Trinkaus Zagzebski (eds.), Virtue Epistemology: Essays on Epistemic Virtue and Responsibility. Oxford University Press 15--29.
Paul A. Boghossian (1990). The Status of Content. Philosophical Review 99 (2):157-84.
Robert Brandom (1988). Pragmatism, Phenomenalism, and Truth Talk. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 12 (1):75-93.

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Citations of this work BETA
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Book Symposium:Truth as One and Many. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):105-114.
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