David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophical Quarterly 54 (217):497–517 (2004)
Minimalists generally see themselves as engaged in a descriptive project. They maintain that they can explain everything we want to say about truth without appealing to anything other than the T-schema, i.e., the idea that the proposition that p is true iff p. I argue that despite recent claims to the contrary, minimalists cannot explain one important belief many people have about truth, namely, that truth is good. If that is so, then minimalism, and possibly deflationism as a whole, must be rejected or recast as a profoundly revisionary project
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Citations of this work BETA
Michael P. Lynch (2009). Truth, Value and Epistemic Expressivism. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 79 (1):76-97.
Christian Piller (2009). Desiring the Truth and Nothing but the Truth. Noûs 43 (2):193-213.
Benjamin Jarvis (2012). Book Symposium:Truth as One and Many. International Journal of Philosophical Studies 20 (1):105-114.
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