David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
The question—Are Persons More than Social Objects?—is an important one, and my answer is somewhat complicated. What I shall talk about here is the way in which persons are natural objects, but I do not want to deny that we are also social objects. I believe that to be a person in the way that I shall describe—as a natural object—is a necessary condition for various enterprises that may be thought of as the social construction of persons. For example, one could not construct a selfnarrative that makes sense of one’s life as a whole unless one had the formal ontological property of personhood that I’ll discuss.
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library||
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Peterson (1999). Natural Law, End, And Virtue In Aquinas. Journal of Philosophical Research 24:397-413.
John Barresi (1999). On Becoming a Person. Philosophical Psychology 12 (1):79-98.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2008). “Tätigsein Und Die Erste-Person-Perspektive” (Agency and the First-Person Perspective). In Bruno Niederbacher & Edmund Runggaldier (eds.), Was Sind Menschliche Personen? Onto Verlag.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2002). The Ontological Status of Persons. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (2):370-388.
Robert A. Wilson (2005). Persons, Social Agency, and Constitution. Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2):49-69.
Lynne Rudder Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):5-6.
Lynne Baker (2007). Persons and Other Things. Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (s 5-6):17-36.
Added to index2009-02-14
Total downloads39 ( #46,447 of 1,099,731 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #51,106 of 1,099,731 )
How can I increase my downloads?