|Abstract||The question—Are Persons More than Social Objects?—is an important one, and my answer is somewhat complicated. What I shall talk about here is the way in which persons are natural objects, but I do not want to deny that we are also social objects. I believe that to be a person in the way that I shall describe—as a natural object—is a necessary condition for various enterprises that may be thought of as the social construction of persons. For example, one could not construct a selfnarrative that makes sense of one’s life as a whole unless one had the formal ontological property of personhood that I’ll discuss.|
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