Three models of conceptual schemes

Inquiry 40 (4):407 – 426 (1997)
Despite widespread confusion over its meaning, the notion of a conceptual scheme is pervasive in Anglo-American philosophy, particularly amongst those who call themselves ' conceptual relativists'. In this paper, I identify three different ways to understand conceptual schemes. I argue that the two most common models, deriving from Kant and Quine, are flawed, and, in addition, useless for the relativist. Instead, I urge adoption of a 'neo-Kantian', broadly Wittgensteinian model, which, it is ' argued, is immune from Davidsonian objections to the very idea of a scheme
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/00201749708602460
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 22,631
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA

View all 17 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Michael P. Lynch (1999). Relativity of Fact and Content. Southern Journal of Philosophy 37 (4):579-595.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

101 ( #42,946 of 1,938,717 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

7 ( #83,335 of 1,938,717 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.