Croatian Journal of Philosophy 11 (2):149-158 (2011)
|Abstract||In this paper, I make two points about Richard’s truth relativism. First, I argue his truth relativism is at odds with his account of truth-aptness. Second, I argue that his truth relativism commits him to a form of pluralism about truth|
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