Graduate studies at Western
Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):173-195 (2002)
|Abstract||In a series of papers written over the last two decades, Terence Horgan has articulated a radical position on truth and metaphysics that he calls contextual semantics. According to Horgan, we can abandon referentialism – or the idea that truth is always and everywhere understood in terms of the referential relations between words and world – while still sensibly believing in a mind-independent world. The centerpiece of contextual semantics is that it allows for some flexibility about truth: statements of different sorts can be true in different ways depending on the degree to which they correspond to the world. In this paper, I explore the consequences of this position.While I believe that contextual semantics has significant advantages, there is a deep tension between Horgan'stolerance of more than one kind of truth and his belief in one type of reality – a tension that threatens to undermine the entire position.|
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Timothy Williamson (2009). Reference, Inference, and the Semantics of Pejoratives. In Joseph Almog & Paolo Leonardi (eds.), The Philosophy of David Kaplan. Oxford University Press.
João Marcos (2009). What is a Non-Truth-Functional Logic? Studia Logica 92 (2):215 - 240.
Matt Leonard (2012). Burge's Contextual Theory of Truth and the Super-Liar Paradox. In Michal Pelis Vit Puncochar (ed.), The Logica Yearbook 2011. College Publications.
Tadeusz Szubka (2002). Truth as Correct Assertibility: An Intermediate Position? Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):157-171.
Terence Horgan (1998). Actualism, Quantification, and Contextual Semantics. Philosophical Perspectives 12 (S12):503-509.
Claire Horisk (2007). The Expressive Role of Truth in Truth-Conditional Semantics. Philosophical Quarterly 57 (229):535–557.
Michael Glanzberg (2007). Context, Content, and Relativism. Philosophical Studies 136 (1):1--29.
Terry Horgan & Matjaž Potrč (2006). Particularist Semantic Normativity. Acta Analytica 21 (1):45-61.
Jay Newhard (2009). The Chrysippus Intuition and Contextual Theories of Truth. Philosophical Studies 142 (3):345 - 352.
Maria E. Reicher (2002). Ontological Commitment and Contextual Semantics. Grazer Philosophische Studien 63 (1):141-155.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads15 ( #86,080 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #61,778 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?