Graduate studies at Western
Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311 (2011)
|Abstract||Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.|
|Keywords||perception encapsulation cognitive penetration justification modularity reliabilism epistemology|
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