Circularity, reliability, and the cognitive penetrability of perception

Philosophical Issues 21 (1):289-311 (2011)
Abstract
Is perception cognitively penetrable, and what are the epistemological consequences if it is? I address the latter of these two questions, partly by reference to recent work by Athanassios Raftopoulos and Susanna Seigel. Against the usual, circularity, readings of cognitive penetrability, I argue that cognitive penetration can be epistemically virtuous, when---and only when---it increases the reliability of perception.
Keywords perception  encapsulation  cognitive penetration  justification  modularity  reliabilism  epistemology
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    References found in this work BETA
    Roderick M. Chisholm (1966). Theory of Knowledge. Englewood Cliffs, N.J.,Prentice-Hall.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Samuel Schindler (2013). Theory-Laden Experimentation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Part A 44 (1):89-.
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