David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Synthese 182 (3):413-432 (2010)
Some have argued that chance and determinism are compatible in order to account for the objectivity of probabilities in theories that are compatible with determinism, like Classical Statistical Mechanics (CSM) and Evolutionary Theory (ET). Contrarily, some have argued that chance and determinism are incompatible, and so such probabilities are subjective. In this paper, I argue that both of these positions are unsatisfactory. I argue that the probabilities of theories like CSM and ET are not chances, but also that they are not subjective probabilities either. Rather, they are a third type of probability, which I call counterfactual probability. The main distinguishing feature of counterfactual-probability is the role it plays in conveying important counterfactual information in explanations. This distinguishes counterfactual probability from chance as a second concept of objective probability.
|Keywords||Chance Determinism Probability concepts Objective probability Credence|
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References found in this work BETA
David Z. Albert (2000). Time and Chance. Harvard University Press.
Robert W. Batterman (1992). Explanatory Instability. Noûs 26 (3):325-348.
John C. Bigelow (1976). Possible Worlds Foundations for Probability. Journal of Philosophical Logic 5 (3):299--320.
John C. Bigelow (1977). Semantics of Probability. Synthese 36 (4):459--72.
Antony Eagle (2004). Twenty-One Arguments Against Propensity Analyses of Probability. Erkenntnis 60 (3):371–416.
Citations of this work BETA
Roman Frigg & Carl Hoefer (2013). The Best Humean System for Statistical Mechanics. Erkenntnis:1-24.
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