David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Philosophy of Science 70 (5):891-901 (2003)
Scientific realists have claimed that the posit that our theories are (approximately) true provides the best or the only explanation for their success . In response, I revive two non-realists explanations. I show that realists, in discarding them, have either misconstrued the phenomena to be explained or mischaracterized the relationship between these explanations and their own. I contend nonetheless that these non-realist competitors, as well as their realist counterparts, should be rejected; for none of them succeed in explaining a significant list of successes. I propose a related non-realist explanation of success that appears to be the most suitable among those considered.
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Paul Hoyningen-Huene (2011). Reconsidering the Miracle Argument on the Supposition of Transient Underdetermination. Synthese 180 (2):173 - 187.
Timothy D. Lyons (2011). The Problem of Deep Competitors and the Pursuit of Epistemically Utopian Truths. Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):317-338.
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