Goldman on Evidence and Reliability

In H. Kornblith & B. McLaughlin (eds.), Goldman and His Critics. Blackwell (forthcoming)
Abstract
Goldman, though still a reliabilist, has made some recent concessions to evidentialist epistemologies. I agree that reliabilism is most plausible when it incorporates certain evidentialist elements, but I try to minimize the evidentialist component. I argue that fewer beliefs require evidence than Goldman thinks, that Goldman should construe evidential fit in process reliabilist terms, rather than the way he does, and that this process reliabilist understanding of evidence illuminates such important epistemological concepts as propositional justification, ex ante justification, and defeat.
Keywords epistemology  reliabilism  evidentialism  epistemic defeat  propositional justification  ex ante justification  nondoxastic evidence  process reliabilism  indicator reliabilism
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