David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Humans and other animals are capable of thought, emotion, consciousness, and understanding. Galaxies, trees, rocks, and chairs are not. Why is this? Is it merely that we are more complicated, or that we are made out of a different kind of material? Or is it that we are not entirely material at all? That is, what does it mean to say that something has a mind? In this course, we will focus on the mind-body problem, the question of how the mind is related to the body, but we will also address a number of related questions: Can computers think? How is it that our thoughts manage to be about other things? What is the nature of consciousness? What do psychology, neuroscience, and artificial intelligence have to tell us about the fundamental nature of the mind?
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