Perception and virtue reliabilism

Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261 (2009)
In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that ) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to reject the perceptual model of intuition, and that we should reject the “perceptual model” of perception as well. Rational intuition and perception should both receive a virtue theoretic (e.g., reliabilist) account, rather than an evidentialist one. To this end, I explicitly argue against the Grounds Principle, which holds that all justified beliefs must be based on some adequate reason, or ground.
Keywords Epistemology  Reliabilism  Evidentialism  Perception  Experience  Grounds
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DOI 10.1007/s12136-009-0064-2
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Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.

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