David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Acta Analytica 24 (4):249-261 (2009)
In some recent work, Ernest Sosa rejects the “perceptual model” of rational intuition, according to which intuitive beliefs (e.g., that ) are justified by standing in the appropriate relation to a nondoxastic intellectual experience (a seeming-true, or the like), in much the way that perceptual beliefs are often held to be justified by an appropriate relation to nondoxastic sense experiential states. By extending some of Sosa’s arguments and adding a few of my own, I argue that Sosa is right to reject the perceptual model of intuition, and that we should reject the “perceptual model” of perception as well. Rational intuition and perception should both receive a virtue theoretic (e.g., reliabilist) account, rather than an evidentialist one. To this end, I explicitly argue against the Grounds Principle, which holds that all justified beliefs must be based on some adequate reason, or ground.
|Keywords||Epistemology Reliabilism Evidentialism Perception Experience Grounds|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
Laurence Bonjour (1980). Externalist Theories of Empirical Knowledge. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 5 (1):53-73.
Richard Feldman & Earl Conee (1985). Evidentialism. Philosophical Studies 48 (1):15 - 34.
Alvin Goldman (1979). ``What is Justified Belief?". In George Pappas (ed.), Justification and Knowledge. Boston: D. Reidel. 1-25.
Michael Huemer (2001). Skepticism and the Veil of Perception. Lanham: Rowman &Amp; Littlefield.
Sean D. Kelly (1999). What Do We See (When We Do)? Philosophical Topics 27 (2):107-28.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
John Greco (2000). Skepticism, Reliabilism, and Virtue Epistemology. The Proceedings of the Twentieth World Congress of Philosophy 5:139-147.
Peter J. Graham (2006). Liberal Fundamentalism and its Rivals. In Jennifer Lackey & Ernest Sosa (eds.), The Epistemology of Testimony. Oxford. 93--115.
Dan D. Crawford (2002). Ultra-Strong Internalism and the Reliabilist Insight. Journal of Philosophical Research 27:311-328.
Christopher Lepock (2006). Adaptability and Perspective. Philosophical Studies 129 (2):377 - 391.
Berit Brogaard (2006). Can Virtue Reliabilism Explain the Value of Knowledge? Canadian Journal of Philosophy 36 (3):335-354.
William Coleman Williams, Perceptual Disanalogy: On the Alstonian Analogy Argument From Religious Experience.
Elijah Chudnoff (2013). Intuitive Knowledge. Philosophical Studies 162 (2):359-378.
Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Steven D. Hales (2012). The Faculty of Intuition. Analytic Philosophy 53 (2):180-207.
Jack C. Lyons (2005). Perceptual Belief and Nonexperiential Looks. Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256.
Added to index2009-11-14
Total downloads55 ( #33,819 of 1,410,217 )
Recent downloads (6 months)10 ( #21,556 of 1,410,217 )
How can I increase my downloads?