Perceptual belief and nonexperiential looks

Philosophical Perspectives 19 (1):237-256 (2005)
How things look (or sound, taste, smell, etc.) plays two important roles in the epistemology of perception.1 First, our perceptual beliefs are episte- mically justified, at least in part, in virtue of how things look. Second, whether a given belief is a perceptual belief, as opposed to, say, an infer- ential belief, is also at least partly a matter of how things look. Together, these yield an epistemically significant sense of looks. A standard view is that how things look, in this epistemically significant sense, is a matter of ones present perceptual phenomenology, of what nondoxastic experiential state one is in. On this standard view, these experiential states (a) determine which of my beliefs are perceptual beliefs and (b) are centrally involved in justifying these beliefs.
Keywords Belief  Epistemology  Justification  Perception
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DOI 10.1111/j.1520-8583.2005.00061.x
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Jack Lyons (2013). Should Reliabilists Be Worried About Demon Worlds? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86 (1):1-40.
Jack Lyons (2010). Response to Critics. [REVIEW] Philosophical Studies 153 (3):477 - 488.

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