Journal for General Philosophy of Science 42 (2):317-338 (2011)
|Abstract||According to standard scientific realism, science seeks truth and we can justifiably believe that our successful theories achieve, or at least approximate, that goal. In this paper, I discuss the implications of the following competitor thesis: Any theory we may favor has competitors such that we cannot justifiably deny that they are approximately true. After defending that thesis, I articulate three specific threats it poses for standard scientific realism; one is epistemic, the other two are axiological (that is, pertaining to the claim that science seeks truth). I also flag an additional axiological “challenge,” that of how one might justify the pursuit of a primary aim, such as truth. Bracketing epistemic realism, I argue that the axiological threats can be addressed by embracing a refined realist axiological hypothesis, one that specifies a specific subclass of true claims sought in science. And after identifying three potential responses to the axiological “challenge,” I contend that, while standard axiological realism appears to lack the resources required to utilize any of the responses, the refined realist axiology I embrace is well suited to each|
|Keywords||Aims of science Axiological realism Scientific realism Underdetermination of theories by data|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Timothy D. Lyons (2005). Toward a Purely Axiological Scientific Realism. Erkenntnis 63 (2):167 - 204.
Anna Jedynak (2000). Struktura teorii naukowych i systemów wartości. Filozofia Nauki 3.
Henry J. Folse (1990). Laudan's Model of Axiological Change and the Bohr-Einstein Debate. PSA: Proceedings of the Biennial Meeting of the Philosophy of Science Association 1990:77 - 88.
Thomas L. Carson (2007). Axiology, Realism, and the Problem of Evil. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 75 (2):349–368.
Darrell P. Rowbottom (forthcoming). Aimless Science. Synthese:1-11.
Timothy D. Lyons (2009). Non-Competitor Conditions in the Scientific Realism Debate. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 23 (1):65-84.
Jarrett Leplin (1990). Renormalizing Epistemology. Philosophy of Science 57 (1):20-33.
Shelby D. Hunt (2011). Theory Status, Inductive Realism, and Approximate Truth: No Miracles, No Charades. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 25 (2):159 - 178.
D. Harker (2013). How to Split a Theory: Defending Selective Realism and Convergence Without Proximity. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 64 (1):79-106.
Antonio Diéguez-Lucena (2006). Why Does Laudan's Confutation of Convergent Realism Fail? Journal for General Philosophy of Science 37 (2):393 - 403.
Gerald Doppelt (2007). Reconstructing Scientific Realism to Rebut the Pessimistic Meta-Induction. Philosophy of Science 74 (1):96-118.
Brian Ellis (1988). Internal Realism. Synthese 76 (3):409 - 434.
Pierre Cruse (2004). Scientific Realism, Ramsey Sentences and the Reference of Theoretical Terms. International Studies in the Philosophy of Science 18 (2 & 3):133 – 149.
Added to index2011-08-26
Total downloads19 ( #71,204 of 722,874 )
Recent downloads (6 months)1 ( #60,917 of 722,874 )
How can I increase my downloads?