David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
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In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos 79 (2009)
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction.
|Keywords||multiple realizability reduction shared properties approximation and idealization|
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Holger Lyre (2016). Active Content Externalism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 7 (1):17-33.
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