David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos. 79 (2009)
Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction.
|Keywords||multiple realizability reduction shared properties approximation and idealization|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
No references found.
Citations of this work BETA
No citations found.
Similar books and articles
Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Multiple Realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers. Abstracta 6 (2):216-230.
Sven Walter (2006). Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.
Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
Eric Funkhouser (2007). A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
Sungsu Kim (2002). Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
Thomas Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143 - 170.
Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
Added to index2009-03-07
Total downloads140 ( #7,709 of 1,410,035 )
Recent downloads (6 months)6 ( #38,341 of 1,410,035 )
How can I increase my downloads?