Graduate studies at Western
In A. Hieke & H. Leitgeb (eds.), Reduction - Abstraction - Analysis. Ontos (2009)
|Abstract||Multiple Realizability (MR) must still be regarded as one of the principal arguments against type reductionist accounts of higher-order properties and their special laws. Against this I argue that there is no unique MR but rather a multitude of MR categories. In a slogan: MR is itself “multi-realized”. If this is true then we cannot expect one unique reductionist strategy against MR as an anti-reductionist argument. The main task is rather to develop a taxonomy of the wide variety of MR cases and to sketch possible reductionist answers for each class of cases. The paper outlines some first steps in this direction.|
|Keywords||multiple realizability reduction shared properties approximation and idealization|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
|Through your library||Configure|
Similar books and articles
Ronald P. Endicott (forthcoming). Multiple Realizability. In Encyclopedia of Philosophy. Macmillan Press.
Ricardo Restrepo (2012). Multiple Realizability and Novel Causal Powers. Abstracta 6 (2):216-230.
Sven Walter (2006). Multiple Realizability and Reduction: A Defense of the Disjunctive Move. Metaphysica 7 (1):43-65.
Eric Funkhouser (2007). Multiple Realizability. Philosophy Compass 2 (2):303–315.
Eric Funkhouser (2007). A Liberal Conception of Multiple Realizability. Philosophical Studies 132 (3):467-494.
Sungsu Kim (2002). Testing Multiple Realizability: A Discussion of Bechtel and Mundale. Philosophy of Science 69 (4):606-610.
John Bickle (1995). Connectionism, Reduction, and Multiple Realizability. Behavior and Philosophy 23 (2):29-39.
William Jaworski (2002). Multiple-Realizability, Explanation and the Disjunctive Move. Philosophical Studies 108 (3):289 - 308.
Thomas Polger (2002). Putnam's Intuition. Philosophical Studies 109 (2):143 - 170.
Robert Francescotti (1997). What Multiple Realizability Does Not Show. Journal of Mind and Behavior 18 (1):13-28.
Added to index2009-03-07
Total downloads106 ( #7,002 of 739,396 )
Recent downloads (6 months)42 ( #1,949 of 739,396 )
How can I increase my downloads?