Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'

A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or ‘given’ to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, ‘givenness as availability’, is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient and suitable for first-order theories of consciousness.
Keywords Consciousness  Self-awareness  Higher-order theories of consciousness  Phenomenological theories of consciousness  Givenness of consciousness
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DOI 10.1007/s11097-008-9110-6
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Dorothée Legrand (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.

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