Two senses for 'givenness of consciousness'

Abstract
A number of theories of consciousness define consciousness by the folk-intuition that consciousness is somehow aware of, or ‘given’ to itself. I attempt to undermine this intuition on phenomenological, conceptual and psychological grounds. An alternative, first-order theory of consciousness, however, faces the task of explaining the possibility of self-awareness for consciousness, as well as the everyday intuition supporting it. I propose that another, weaker kind of givenness, ‘givenness as availability’, is up to both of these tasks, and is therefore sufficient and suitable for first-order theories of consciousness.
Keywords Consciousness  Self-awareness  Higher-order theories of consciousness  Phenomenological theories of consciousness  Givenness of consciousness
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    References found in this work BETA
    Ned Block (2002). A. G enera. In David J. Chalmers (ed.), Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings. Oxford University Press. 206.

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    Citations of this work BETA
    Dorothée Legrand (2009). Two Senses for 'Givenness of Consciousness'. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 8 (1):89-94.
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