Voluntary Action: Brains, Minds, and Sociality
David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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Oxford University Press (2003)
We all know what a voluntary action is - we all think we know when an action is voluntary, and when it is not. Yet, performing and action and defining it are different matters. What counts as an action? When does it begin? Does the conscious desire to perform an action always precede the act? If not, is it really a voluntary action? This is a debate that crosses the boundaries of Philosophy, Neuroscience, Psychology, and Social Science. This book brings together some to the leading thinkers from these disciplines to consider this deep and often puzzling topic. The result is a fascinating and stimulating debate that will challenge our fundamental assumptions about our sense of free-will.
|Keywords||Intentionalism Free will and determinism|
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|Buy the book||$239.63 new (8% off) $260.00 direct from Amazon $303.11 used Amazon page|
|Call number||BF619.5.V66 2003|
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Sabine Maasen, A View From Elsewhere: The Emergence of Consciousness in Multidisciplinary Discourse.
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Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle (2010). From Uncaused Will to Conscious Choice: The Need to Study, Not Speculate About People’s Folk Concept of Free Will. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 1 (2):211-224.
Steve Guglielmo, Andrew E. Monroe & Bertram F. Malle (2009). At the Heart of Morality Lies Folk Psychology. Inquiry 52 (5):449-466.
Sven Walter (2014). Willusionism, Epiphenomenalism, and the Feeling of Conscious Will. Synthese 191 (10):2215-2238.
Tillmann Vierkant (2015). How Do You Know That You Settled a Question? Philosophical Explorations 18 (2):199-211.
Tim Ray (2009). Rethinking Polanyi's Concept of Tacit Knowledge: From Personal Knowing to Imagined Institutions. [REVIEW] Minerva 47 (1):75-92.
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