A challenge to the kripke/putnam distinction between epistemic and metaphysical necessity

Southwest Philosophy Review 13 (2):113--128 (1997)
Abstract
I argue that the account of the epistemic modalities developed by Kripke and Putnam is incomplete since it does not make use of the possible worlds machinery that is indispensable to their analysis of the metaphysical modalities. It would have been simpler and more elegant if they had used the concept of 'possible world' to explain both modalities. Instead, they provide an explication of the epistemic modalities in terms of the vague concepts of conceivability and revisability. I show that logical omniscience as a consequence of a possible worlds analysis of the epistemic modalities can be made palatable.
Keywords Epistemology, Necessity, Semantics
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