David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Jack Alan Reynolds
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OUP Oxford (2014)
John MacFarlane explores how we might make sense of the idea that truth is relative. He provides new, satisfying accounts of parts of our thought and talk that have resisted traditional methods of analysis, including what we mean when we talk about what is tasty, what we know, what will happen, what might be the case, and what we ought to do
|Keywords||relative truth assessment sensitivity context sensitivity relativism truth|
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Citations of this work BETA
James Andow (2014). Intuitions, Disagreement and Referential Pluralism. Review of Philosophy and Psychology 5 (2):223-239.
Max Kölbel (2013). The Conversational Role of Centered Contents. Inquiry 56 (2-3):97-121.
Mikkel Gerken (2015). How to Do Things with Knowledge Ascriptions. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 90 (1):223-234.
Isidora Stojanovic (2012). On Value-Attributions: Semantics and Beyond. Southern Journal of Philosophy 50 (4):621-638.
Michele Palmira (forthcoming). Why Truth-Relativists Should Be Non-Conformists. Acta Analytica:1-9.
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