Bare personhood? Velleman on selfhood

Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):263 – 282 (2007)
In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that 'the word "self" does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind' (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of 'bare personhood' in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1080/13869790701535287
 Save to my reading list
Follow the author(s)
My bibliography
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Revision history Request removal from index
Download options
PhilPapers Archive

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy on self-archival     Papers currently archived: 15,914
External links
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library
References found in this work BETA
Paul Ricoeur (1995). Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press.

View all 18 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA
Patrick Stokes (2011). Uniting the Perspectival Subject: Two Approaches. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):23-44.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Monthly downloads

Added to index


Total downloads

80 ( #37,711 of 1,725,574 )

Recent downloads (6 months)

2 ( #268,753 of 1,725,574 )

How can I increase my downloads?

My notes
Sign in to use this feature

Start a new thread
There  are no threads in this forum
Nothing in this forum yet.