David Bourget (Western Ontario)
David Chalmers (ANU, NYU)
Rafael De Clercq
Ezio Di Nucci
Jack Alan Reynolds
Learn more about PhilPapers
Philosophical Explorations 10 (3):263 – 282 (2007)
In the Introduction to Self to Self, J. David Velleman claims that 'the word "self" does not denote any one entity but rather expresses a reflexive guise under which parts or aspects of a person are presented to his own mind' (Velleman 2006, 1). Velleman distinguishes three different reflexive guises of the self: the self of the person's self-image, or narrative self-conception; the self of self-sameness over time; and the self as autonomous agent. Velleman's account of each of these different guises of the self is complex and repays close philosophical attention. The first aim of this paper is therefore to provide a detailed analysis of Velleman's view. The second aim is more critical. While I am in agreement with Velleman about the importance of distinguishing the different aspects of selfhood, I argue that, even on his own account, they are more interrelated than he acknowledges. I also analyse the role of the concept of 'bare personhood' in Velleman's approach to selfhood and question whether this concept can function, as he wants it to, to bridge the gap between a naturalistic analysis of reasons for action and Kantian moral reasons
|Keywords||No keywords specified (fix it)|
|Categories||categorize this paper)|
Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
|Through your library|
References found in this work BETA
David Hume (1739/2000). A Treatise of Human Nature. Oxford University Press.
Paul Ricoeur (1995). Oneself as Another. University of Chicago Press.
J. David Velleman (1996). The Possibility of Practical Reason. Ethics 106 (4):694-726.
Marya Schechtman (1996). The Constitution of Selves. Cornell University Press.
Ian Hacking (1995). Rewriting the Soul: Multiple Personality and the Sciences of Memory. Princeton University Press.
Citations of this work BETA
Diana Tietjens Meyers (2014). Corporeal Selfhood, Self-Interpretation, and Narrative Selfhood. Philosophical Explorations 17 (2):141-153.
Patrick Stokes (2011). Uniting the Perspectival Subject: Two Approaches. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 10 (1):23-44.
Priscilla Brandon (2016). Body and Self: An Entangled Narrative. Phenomenology and the Cognitive Sciences 15 (1):67-83.
Similar books and articles
Gideon Yaffe (1995). Velleman on Intentions as Reasons for Action. Analysis 55 (2):107 - 115.
Philip Clark (2001). Velleman's Autonomism. Ethics 111 (3):580–593.
Jose L. Zalabardo (2010). Why Believe the Truth? Shah and Velleman on the Aim of Belief. Philosophical Explorations 13 (1):1 - 21.
James David Velleman (2006). Self to Self: Selected Essays. Cambridge University Press.
Richard Menary (2008). Embodied Narratives. Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (6):63-84.
David Velleman (1989). Practical Reflection. Princeton University Press.
Diana T. Meyers (2005). Who's There? Selfhood, Self-Regard, and Social Relations. Hypatia 20 (4):200-215.
Added to index2009-01-28
Total downloads88 ( #46,749 of 1,796,170 )
Recent downloads (6 months)5 ( #171,366 of 1,796,170 )
How can I increase my downloads?